of channel versions are fulfilled without thorough analysis of their independence and assessment of real diversity degree assessed by special metrics, for example, β-factor (Bukowsky&Goble, 1994).
Complex electronic components and FPGA technology for NPP I&Cs development
An analysis of development and introduction trends of computer technologies to NPP I&Cs has specified a number of important aspects affecting their safety, peculiarities of development, update and licensing. Such trends include, among others (Yastrebenetsky, 2004) : introduction of novel complex electronic components (CECs); expanded nomenclature of software applied and increased effect of its quality to I&Cs safety; realization of novel principles and technologies in I&Cs development; advent of a large number of novel standards regulating the processes of I&Cs development and safety assessment. During recent decades the application of microprocessor techniques in NPP I&Cs design has substantially expanded. Microprocessors are used both in system computer core and in realization of intellectual peripherals -various sensors, drives and other devices with built-in programmable controllers. Another contemporary trend is dynamically growing application of programmable logic technologies, particularly, Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) in NPP I&Cs, onboard aerospace systems and other critical areas. FPGA as a kind of CECs is a convenient mean not only in realization of auxiliary functions of transformation and logical processing of information, but also in execution of basic monitoring and control functions inherent in NPP I&Cs. This approach in some cases is more reasonable than application of softwarecontrolled microprocessors (Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008) . In assessment of FPGA-based I&Cs it should be taken into consideration that application of this technologies somewhat levels the difference between hardware and software, whereas obtained solutions are an example of a peculiar realization of so called heterosystems -systems with "fuzzy" softwarehardware architecture and mixed execution of functions. This circumstance and other features of FPGA technology increase a number of diversity types and enlarge a set of possible diversity-oriented decisions for NPP I&Cs.
Work related analysis
Known works, related to the current problem and taking into account features of NPP I&C systems, are divided into three groups: (1) classification and analysis of version redundancy types and diversity-oriented decisions; (2) methods and techniques of diversity level assessment and evaluation of multi-version systems safety in context of CCFs; (3) multiversion technologies of safety critical systems development. 1. A set of diversity classification schemes (general, software and FPGA-based) was analyzed in ). First one is based on NUREG technical reports and guides, samples two-level hierarchy and includes seven main groups of version redundancy (Wood et al., 2009) (Pullum, 2001; Volkoviy et al., 2008) : life cycle models and processes of development (for example, V-model for main version and waterfall model with minimum set of processes for duplicate version); resources and means (different human resources, languages and notations, tools); project decisions (different architectures and platforms, protocols, data formats, etc). Next one FPGA-based classification includes the following types of diversity (Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008; ): diversity of electronic elements (different electronic elements manufactures, technologies of production, electronic elements families, etc); diversity of CASE-tools (different developers, kinds and configurations of CASE-tools); diversity of projects development languages (different graphical scheme languages, hardware description languages and IP-cores); diversity of specifications (specification languages) and others. 2. There are following methods of diversity level assessment and evaluation of MVS dependability and safety redundancy for intra-and inter-crystal levels; diversity implementation; reconfiguration and recovery in the case of component failures; improved means of diagnostic. 4. Security assurance: FPGA reprogramming is possible only with use of especial equipment. Stability and survivability assurance due to: tolerance to external impacts (electromagnetic, climatic, radiation); possibilities of implementation of multi-step degradation with different types of adaptation.
FPGA technology application in safety-critical systems and NPP I&Cs
Due to these peculiarities area of FPGA technology application essentially has expanded. We can say about a affirmative answer to question "Expansion of FPGA-technology application in safety-critical systems for the last decades: evolution or revolution?" It is confirmed by 
A law "negation of negation": Stages of diversity approach implementation evolution in NPP I&Cs
Interesting are the results of transformation of multi-version I&Cs for the last decades in context of hardware-software-FPGA technologies development. There are a few diversity implementation evolution stages in safety-critical NPP I&Cs, in particular, reactor trip systems. Analysis of these stages allows formulating (or demonstrating truth) a law "negation of negation" 1970-1980s ) -use of hardware (hard logic, HL)-based one-version systems and transition from hardware (HW)-based systems with identical subsystems to systems with hardware (HL)-based primary subsystem and software (microprocessor, MP)-based secondary subsystem; it was the first "negation"; -stage 2 (1990s) -use of primary and secondary subsystems with software (SW) diversity (I&C platforms produced by Siemens, WH and other companies); example of multiversion systems with software diversity is two-version system consisting of subsystems developed using microprocessors Intel and Motorola (languages C and Ada); it completed the first cycle of "negation of negation"; -stage 3 (2000s, first half) -transition to FPGA-based primary and software-based secondary subsystems with equipment, design and software diversity (first generation of the I&C platforms produced by RPC Radiy); it was next "negation"; -stage 4 (2000s, second half) -application of FPGA-oriented soft processors for primary subsystem and FPGA project developed using HDL-oriented language (hard logic) for creation of secondary subsystem (next generation of the I&C platform produced by RPC Radiy); it completed the second cycle of "negation of negation"; -stage 5 (beginning of 2010s) -application of different FPGAs (hard logic) produced by different manufacturers (and other types of diversity) for primary and secondary subsystems correspondingly; it is next "negation". What will be the next step? Probably, advancement of electronic technologies, in particular, nanotechnologies, naturally dependable, safe and secure chips will create new perspectives and possibilities for development of diversity-oriented decisions. Actel, Altera and others companies inform about creating first chips called nano FPGAs allowing to develop faulttolerant projects using large-scale means. . Requirement on nuclear and radiation safety to I&Cs important to safety in NPPs (Ukraine), etc. These standards contain general requirements concerning: systems which must/should be developed using diversity approach (Reactor Trip Systems); types of diversity used to develop NPP I&Cs and to decrease CCF probability; features of diversity implementation, determination of types and volume of diversity; assessment (justification) of real level of diversity in developed systems; drawbacks and benefits connected with the use of diversity. The standards are not enough detailed to make all necessary decisions concerning diversity. It's important to develop additional detailed techniques of assessing diversity and choosing optimal kinds and volume of diversity according to criterion "safetyreliability-cost".
Normative base and key challenges connected with diversity application in NPP I&Cs

Key challenges
Main conclusions concerning FPGA-based MVS development and implementation experience are the following: FPGA-based multi-version I&Cs are used in NPPs during 6-8 last years, i.e. these systems are new object of analysis and still more unique one; FPGA technology gives additional possibilities to develop MVSs and ensure high safety and reliability; processes of FPGA project development are similar to processes of SW-based project development. FPGA project product is similar to HW-based project product (hard logic); there are not any international standards determined requirements to use of diversity for I&Cs development and application taking into account FPGA features. Results of comparative analysis of challenges caused by development and application of software-and FPGA-based multi-version systems are presented in Table 2 .
Main concepts and models of multi-version computing
4.1 Taxonomy scheme of multi-version computing A set of concepts concerning diversity may be united by general term "multi-version computing" on the analogy with "dependable computing" (Avižienis et al., 2004) . Multiversion computing is a type of dependable computing organization based on use of diversity approach. Taxonomy scheme of multi-version computing developed taking into consideration concepts in this area described in international standards includes the following elements (Fig.3) . Version is an option of the different realization of identical task (by use software, hardware or FPGA-based products and life cycle processes); identical versions of structure redundancy-based system are trivial. Version redundancy (VR) is a type of product and process redundancy allowing to create different (non-trivial) versions; product VR is realized jointly with structure, time and other types of non-version redundancy. Multi-version project (MVP) is a project in which the multi-version technology is applied (version redundancy of processes is used) leading to creation of one-or multi-version system (realization of version redundancy of products). Strategy of diversity (MV) is a collection of general criteria and rules defining principles of formation and selection of version redundancy types and volume or/and choice of MVTs. Besides, important elements of multi-version computing are concepts "multi-version life cycle", "diversity metric". More detailed interpretation of these concepts will be done below.
Diversity type classification schemes
Different variants of diversity type classifications were described above. The analysis of the considered classifications allows approving that: -they are presented by classifications of mixed facet-hierarchical or matrix (network) types; -the NUREG-based classification presented in (Wood et al., 2009 ) is the most detailed and systematic, though the principle of attributes orthogonality is not sustained in full in it; for example, subsets of design and software, functional and signal version redundancy are crossed and dependent; -variety of product (system, hardware and software components) and of process (technologies of development, testing and maintenance) version redundancy cause complexity of VR selection and MVS development. More general diversity type classification scheme is so-called "cube" of diversity described by matrix MVR = vr ijk  in three-dimensional space (Fig. 4) . The scheme has coordinates: stage of LC (i); level of project decisions (PD, j) and type of VR (project decision). Example of two-space matrix presented a cut of "cube" for FPGA-based systems is shown on the table 3. This table contains variants of joint application of one or two diversity types (items 1.4.2-1.4.4, 2.3.3-2.3.8, 3.3.3-3.3.8, 4.2.4-4.2.15; for example, last combinations correspond to 12 = 4 (kinds of EE diversity) х 3 (kinds of CASE-tool diversity) couples). Table 2 . Matrix of diversity-oriented FPGA-based decisions
Models multi-version systems
One-version W(1) and multi-version W(n) systems are defined by 4 and 6 variables : (1) and (2), multi-version system and one-version system are connected by relationship:
System W(1) may be structure-redundant and contain usual means  for signals processing from identical channels (versions). In this case card V=1. For system W(n) is true that: There are the following means of transforming  s : (a) the conjunctive, when Thus, different diversity kinds, rR, are accumulated in final versions of a multi-version system. It is described by special mapping  : R  V. Mapping  may be presented by Boolean matrix d j , d=1,m;j = 1, n , where  dj =1, if diversity kind r p is used in version v j , and if not  dj = 0. Then multi-version system W(n,m) or multi-diversion system is described by formula:
It is important to describe correspondence between a set of versions V and a set of redundant channels С={c q , q=1,...,l}. This correspondence may be defined by mapping Q:V C. This mapping is presented by Boolean matrix Q =  jg , d=1,m, g=1,l , where  gj = 1, if version v i is realized by channel c j , and if not  gj = 0. Then model of multi-version (multi-diversion) system is the following:
MVSs with temporal redundancy and р iterations of algorithms are indicated as W(n,m,n,р) dividing number of parallel (structural) versions n c , and sequential versions realized by using one channel. Set Х may be decomposed for different versions if
Such MVSs are called multi-version systems with naturally divided input alphabet:
If versions process data presented in different notations, such MVSs are called multi-version systems with artificially divided input alphabet WAХ. A special function-transformer Пх (Пхj) should be specified in addition to alphabet Х : 
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Besides, I&Cs performing safety-critical functions may be represented by a composition of two interconnected subsystems -monitoring (checking) subsystem and control subsystem (monitoring and control automata). Monitoring automaton  C analyses output signals X from monitoring and control object (MCO) and forms its status code Z C . Control automaton  U forms control signals Z in accordance with signals Z C . Several options of MVS architectures are possible for a FPGA-based I&Cs. Those options may be classified according with such attributes (see Fig. 5 ): degree of diversity coverage (I&Cs with a full  F and partial  P diversity); diversity depth (I&Cs with a common  O and separate  S diversity); it should be noted that this feature is applicable only to full system diversity.
Models of multi-version life cycle and technology
A model of MVS life cycle (or multi-version LC model) is based on operations of version generation G, aggregation and selection U at various stages . Example of the two-version life cycle model is shown on Fig. 6 taking to account some FPGA-oriented design features (V ij are different versions obtained on different stage of development) (Prokhorova et al., 2008) . In general case I&C system LC is a sequence of N stages. At each i-th stage of a multi-version I&C system LC Mi of diversity types may be applied. From Mi, i = 1,...,N; diversity types only a single j-th type, j = 1,...,Mi, may be selected. Besides, at each i-th stage of LC a single-version development technology may be selected. Each j-th diversity type at each i-th LC stage is characterized by two indices: diversity metrics (depth) dij and cost of respective diversity type application (cost increase as compared to single-version option of each i-th LC stage). Thus, a set of solutions on selection of diversity kind is described by two matrices: diversity metrics values D =  d ij  and cost values С =  с ij . Hence MVS LC may be presented as a bipolar N-level graph (Fig.7) called graph of multi-version technologies . MVT corresponds to non-zero way in this graph. Algorithms of MVT (optimal way in the graph) selection according with criteria "diversity (safety)-reliability-cost" are described in (Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008) .
Fig. 7. Graph of MVTs
Assessment of multi-version FPGA-based systems safety
General approach to assessment
Assessment of diversity level and MVS safety is based on the following basic procedures analysis and evaluation: -check-list-based analysis of applicable diversity types (CLD); initial data for the CLD analysis are I&C design and documentation, a table of diversity types (subtypes) was developed in advance; a result of the CLD analysis is a formalized structured information about used diversity types and subtypes in analyzed I&C system; -metric-based assessment of diversity (MAD); initial data for the MAD procedure are results of the CLD analysis and values of metrics and weight coefficients for diversity types (subtypes) used in I&C systems; a result of the MAD assessment is a value of general diversity metric; -Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) and Markovian model (MM)-based assessment taking into account results of MAD.
Stages of assessment
The main stages and operations of diversity analysis and MVS assessment depend on the type of the evaluated system. The first stage is a Check-list-based analysis of MVS design and documentation. This stage contains two operations: 1. Analysis of I&C specification and requirements to system, definition of system safety class; requirements to diversity (necessary for diversity application); 2. Analysis of I&C design and development process that involves activities: (a) identification of MVS types: which of the subsystems are FPGA-based and which are software and microprocessor-based; (b) identification of product diversity; for FPGAbased MVSs: manufacturer of chips; FPGA technology; FPGA families; FPGA chips, languages; tools, etc); (c) identification of process diversity kinds. Results of analysis are entered in a check-list in accordance with rule Yes (if corresponding diversity type is used in a system) / No (in opposite case) and is presented as a n-bit Boolean vector. The second stage is a metric-based assessment of diversity. This stage contains two operations: 1. Determination of metric values for different types of applied diversity, i.e. performing two activities: (a) determination of metric values (local diversity metrics μ i for diversity type d i and local diversity metrics μ ij for diversity subtype d ij ); the metric values may be predefined; (b) correction of metric values in accordance with development and operation experience. 2. Calculation of general diversity metric μ for a system: (a) determination (correction) of weight coefficients ω i (ω ij ) of metrics (taking into account multi-diversity aspect); sum of weight coefficients ω i (ω ij ) is equal 1; (b) convolution (additive or more complex) of metrics and calculating value of general diversity metric μ = Σ ω i Σ ω ij μ ij , i = 1,…, n; j = 1,…n i . Thus, result of this stage is a value of general diversity metric μ, which is some approximation of , and can characterize the diversity effect on CCF probability. The third stage is a probabilistic RBD-or MM-based (RDM) assessment of MVS reliability and safety. Initial data for the RDM procedure are I&C design and documentation, results of the CLD and MAD analysis; results of the RDM procedure are values of safety and dependability indicators. Detailed description of the RDM procedure is given in (Kharchenko et al., 2004) .
Implementation of FPGA-based safety-critical NPP I&Cs
6.1 General description of the FPGA-based RADIY TM platform The platform RADIY TM produced by RPC Radiy is an example of a dependable and scalable FPGA-based I&C platform ensuring possibility of development of multi-version systems. Dependability assurance feature of the I&C platform RADIY TM is multi-diversity implementation through the following diversity types: equipment diversity is provided by different electronic components, different programmable components (FPGAs and microcontrollers) and different schemes of units; software diversity is provided by different programming languages and different tools for development and verification; life cycle (human) diversity is provided by different teams of developers. Scalability of the I&C platform RADIY TM permits to produce different types of safetycritical systems without essential changing of hardware and software components. The I&C platform RADIY TM provides the following types of scalability: scalability of system functions types, volume and peculiarities by changing quantity and quality of sensors, actuators, input/output signals and control algorithms; scalability of dependability (safety integrity) by changing a number of redundant channel, tiers, diagnostic and reconfiguration procedures; scalability of diversity by changing types, depth and criteria of diversity choice. The FPGA-based I&C RADIY TM platform comprises both upper and lower levels (Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008 Room and others. The platform includes the following main modules: chassis and backplanes; power supply modules; analog input modules; normalizing converter modules, thermocouples; normalizing converter modules, resistive temperature detector; discrete input modules; discrete information input modules, pulse; potential signals input modules, high voltage; protection signal forming modules (logic modules); analog output modules, voltage; analog output modules, current; discrete output modules; potential signal output modules; solid-state output modules; relay output modules; actuator control modules; fiber optic communication modules; system diagnostic modules; fan cooling modules etc.
Opportunites of the RADIY
TM platform Application of the RADIY TM platform with the use of FPGA technology provides the following opportunities: -to implement control and other safety-critical functions in the form of FPGA with implemented electronic design, without software; -to use software only for diagnostics, archiving, signal processing, data reception and transfer between I&C systems components; failures of those functions do not affect execution of basic I&C systems control functions, and an operation system is not applied at I&C systems lower levels; -to process parallel of all control algorithms within one cycle, thus ensuring high performance of the system (for instance, a processing cycle of Reactor Trip System is 20 ms) and proven determined temporal characteristics; -to develop the software-hardware platform in such a way that it becomes a universal interface to create I&C systems for any type of reactors; -to assure high reliability and availability due to the application of industrial components as well as using the principles of redundancy, independency, single failure criterion, and diversity; -to modify the I&C system after commissioning in a quite simple manner, including algorithm alterations, without any interference in I&C systems' hardware structure; -to reduce by more than 10 times the number of contact and terminal connections which cause many operational failures of equipment on account of the wide use of integrated solutions and fiber optic communication lines, etc.
Licensing of the RADIY TM platform
The RADIY TM platform has been licensed for NPP application in Ukraine and in Bulgaria. The main idea for licensing FPGA-based NPP I&C systems lays in consideration of FPGAchip as hardware and FPGA electronic design as a special kind of software with specific development and verification stages (Siora et al., 2009b) . Qualification tests of FPGA-based hardware in accordance with International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard requirements include: radiation exposure withstand qualification; environmental (climatic) qualification; seismic and mechanical impacts qualification; electromagnetic compatibility qualification. Results of qualification tests confirmed FPGA-based hardware compliance with IEC safety requirements. FPGA electronic design has a V-shape life cycle in accordance with requirements of standard IEC 62566 "NPP -I&C important to safety -Selection and use of complex electronic components for systems performing category A functions". The safety assessments have been conducted by Ukrainian State Scientific Technical Centre on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SSTC NRS), which is the supporting organization of Ukrainian Regulatory Authority. Experts of SSTC NRS have considerable experience in the area of FPGA-based systems safety assessment, as they have performed reviews of all thirty three FPGA-based safety systems supplied to Ukrainian NPP units since 2003.
Implementation of the RADIY TM platform-based I&Cs in NPPs
The RADIY TM platform has been applied to the following NPP I&Cs systems which perform reactor control and protection functions: Reactor Trip System (RTS); these I&Cs were developed as two-version systems consisting of two triple module redundant subsystems; Reactor Power Control and Limitation System; Engineering Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS); Control Rods Actuation System; Automatic Regulation, Monitoring, Control, and Protection System for Research Reactors; these I&Cs were developed as oneversion systems consisting of triple module redundant subsystems. The first commissioning of the RADIY TM platform was done in 2003 for Ukrainian NPP unit Zaporozhe-1. In seven years since that time, more than 50 applications of RPC Radiy systems have been installed in 17 nuclear power units in Ukraine and Bulgaria. These systems are commissioned in pressurized water reactor (PWR) plants known as "VVER" reactors developed by design companies of the former Soviet Union. VVER reactors are used in Armenia, Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, India, Iran, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The largest project realized by RPC Radiy is the modernization of six ESFASs for Bulgarian NPP Kozloduy (three ESFASs for Kozloduy-Unit 5 and three ESFASs for Kozloduy-Unit 6).
Conclusion
Development and implementation of multi-version FPGA-based systems is new stage of evolution in area of improving safety of NPP I&Cs. In this chapter we discussed basic concepts of diversity as a key approach to decreasing probability of common cause failure of www.intechopen.com
